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Summary  findings
Q ureshi  assesses the  mediumii- to long-term  outlook  for  *  Most  low-income  countries  will continue  to depend
global demanid and supply of capital. He reaches the  mainly on official capital for some time. But official
following  conclusions:  capital  will likely  be increasingly  scarce,  so these
* The demand for investnment  funds in developing  countries must intensify their domestic resource
countries  will remain  strong,  hut  most  increased  demand  mobilization  and accelerate  the  policy  reform  needed  to
will likely  be met  by domestic  savings.  Investment's  share  attract  private  investment.
in GDP will probably  rise in these  countries,  hut so will  *  The  critical  factor  in alleviating  pressure  on global
savings'  share,  so their  net claim  on  industrial  countries'  interest  rates will be progress  on fiscal consolidation  in
savings is likely to remain  small.  Of course,  savings will  industrial  countries,  especially  the reform  of social
not  rise automatically.  It is esseintial that  policies,  security  systems.  Net  capital  flows  from  industrial  to
institutions,  and  the economic  enivironmilienit  be conducive  developing  countries  are much  smaller  than  the budget
to saving.  deficits  in industrial  countries.  In 1994,  for  example,
*  Financial  liberalization  and  integration  of  lowering  the  industrial  countries'  budget  deficit  by about
international  capital  markets  will continiue  to give  20 percent  would  have  freed  up enough  money  to
developing  countries  as a group  improved  access to  finance  the entire  net capital  flow to developing
private  foreign  capital.  But whether  specific countries  countries.
attract  and  sustain  such  inflows  will depenid on  their  *  International  capital  markets  will tend  to remain
economic  prospects  and  policies,  includinig conditions  tight  in the coming  decade,  but  a severe global  capital
that  promnote domestic  saving  and  investment  (to both  squeeze  and  a big increase  in global  real  interest  rates
attract  foreign  capital  and  help  limit it to sustainable  (which  some  fear) are unlikely  if industrial  countries
levels).  lnvestment  needs  in developing  countries  are  continue  fiscal consolidation.  Without  such
great,  but  "effective"  demand  for foreigin capital  will  consolidation,  global  real  interest  rates could  rise well
remain  limited  by the countries'  perceived  above  already  high  recent  levels of about  4 percent,  with
creditworthiness  and  viabiiity.  Despite  the  sharp  rise in  adverse  consequences  for  all countries.
aggregate  private  capital  flows to  developing  countries  in
the  1990s,  only a dozen  or so of them  receive  significant
amounts  of private  capital.
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The Future of the World Economy,  Aspen, Colorado, August 19-23, 1995.  The paper has
benefitted  from comments  received  from  conference  participants.Summary
This paper  assesses the medium- to long-term outlook for  global demand
and supply of capital. It reaches the following main conclusions:
*  The demandfor  investment funds in developing countries will be strong in the
coming years, but the bulk of the rise in investment in these countries is likely
to be met from  their own savings.  While the share of investment in GDP will
likely rise in  these countries, saving as a percentage  of GDP will also rise.
Thus, the net  claim  of  these countries  on  industrial countries'  savings  will
likely remain small.  Saving in developing countries, of course, will not rise
automatically  to  support  higher  investment.  A  domestic  economic
environment, policies  and  institutions  conducive  to  higher  saving  will  be
needed
*  Financial  liberalization  and  international  capital  market  integration  will
continue to improve the access of developing countries as a group  to private
foreign  capital.  But for  individual  countries,  success  in  attracting  and
sustaining  inflows will depend  mainly on country-specific  economic policies
and prospects.  This includes conditions promoting high domestic saving and
investment, which both attract  foreign  capital and help to limit it to sustainable
levels.  While  developing  countries'  investment  needs  are  large,  their
"effective"  demand for foreign  capital  will  continue  to  be limited  by their
creditworthiness  and  viability  in  the  eyes  of  potential  foreign  investors.
Despite  increasing global  capital  market  integration and  the sharp  rise  in
private flows  to developing countries in the 1990s, still only a dozen or so of
these countries are significant recipients ofprivate  capital.Most  low-income countries will remain predominantly  dependent  on official
capitalfor some time to come.  As official capital is likely to be in increasingly
short supply, these countries must intensify domestic resource mobilization and
accelerate policy  reforms that in time will enable them also to attract  private
investment.
a  What will matter for long-term real international interest rates is not so much
the increased competition  for  capitalfrom  developing countries as the balance
of supply  and demand for  capital  within industrial  countries.  The  critical
factor  in alleviating pressure on global interest rates will be progress on fiscal
consolidation in industrial countries, especially the reform of social  security
systems.  The magnitude of the net capital flow from  industrial to developing
countries is small compared with the budget deficits of industrial countries.  In
1994, for  example, a lowering of the  industrial countries'  aggregate budget
deficit by about 20 percent  would have been sufficient to finance  the whole of
the net capitalflow to developing countries.
*  International capital markets will tend to be tight in the coming decade, but a
severe global capital squeeze and a large rise in world real interest rates that
some fear  are unlikely to happen provided progress  on fiscal  consolidation in
industrial countries continues.  However, absent that, world real interest rates
could rise well above the already historically high recent levels of around 4
percent,  with  adverse  consequences  for  both  industrial  and  developing
countries.
2Introduction
A combination.of  factors underlie  recent concerns  about the potential  for a
global 'bapital shortage"'  Capital shortage  is a rather misleading  term. Ex post,
the global demand  for capital must equal the supply, since any shortage can be
eliminated  by a rise in the price of capital-the  rate of interest.  It is therefore
more meaningful to pose the issue ex ante, in terms of the possibility that the
global demand for  capital will tend to  outstrip the  supply, exerting upward
pressure  on world real interest  rates.
Concerns  about tighter  international  capital  markets  and rising interest rates
stem from expectations  that an increasing demand for capital from developing
countries 2 will coincide  with rebounding  investment  in industrial countries  as their
economies  recover, while the supply of capital will fail to keep pace because of
declining private saving rates in the industrial countries and a rising drain on
private savings from govermment  deficits. Such expectations  are reinforced  by a
pattern of world real interest rates over the past decade  that are high by historical
standards (Chart 1), the rise in interest rates being viewed as  evidence of an
increasing pressure of  demand on the available supply of  capital.  From the
perspective  of developing  countries,  the question  is:  will a strongly  rising world
demand  for capital collide with an increasingly  limited supply, causing a global
crowding-out  in which world real interest rates will rise substantially  higher and
capital  flows to developing  countries  will shrink?
For example,  these concerns  find an important  place in George Shultz's Richard T. Ely Lecture  at the
1994 annual meetings  of the American Economic Association  and in the Economic Report to the
President (1995)  of the Council  of Economic  Advisors.
2  Unless  indicated otherwise,  the term developing  countries as used in this paper includes  all low- and
middle-income  countries, including the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet  Union.
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4Analysis of likely  trends over  the next ten to fifteen  years suggests  that such
an outcome is unlikely, but with the important  proviso that fiscal consolidation
efforts in industrial countries remain on track.  The paper first reviews the
prospects  for saving and investment  in developing  countries  and their net demand
for foreign capital. Next it assesses the prospects for the supply and demand  for
capital in industrial countries,  which are net suppliers of capital to international
financial markets.  The last section of the paper draws conclusions from this
analysis  and the main implications  for policy.
Foreign  Capital  Requirements  of Developing  Countries
It  is useful first to place developing countries' net demand for foreign
capital  in perspective. Private  capital  flows to developing  countries  rose sharply  in
the early 1990s,  quadrupling  between 1990  and 1994  (Chart 2). The surge  in these
flows has been a factor feeding the concerns  about demand outrunning  supply in
the  global capital market.  But despite this rise  in private capital flows to
developing  countries,  total net capital flow to these countries  remains  rather small
relative to industrial  country financial  aggregates. To illustrate,  in 1994,  total net
capital flow to developing countries was approximately $130 billion, about 3
percent of industrial  country  gross  national saving  and 0.6 percent of their GDP.
Demandfor  CapitaL  Looking  ahead, the demand  for capital  in developing
countries in the next ten years or so is likely to rise faster than over the past
decade. Current  World Bank  projections  are for real gross domestic  investment  in
developing countries  to rise at an average  annual rate of 6-6.5 percent in 1995-
2004.  That would raise their investment  to GDP ratio from about 24 percent in
1985-1994  to 27-28 percent in  1995-2004.  In  absolute terms, investment in
developing countries could average $1.7-1.8 trillion per  year  in  1995-2004
5(measured  in constant 1994  dollars),  close to fifty percent higher than its estimated
level in 1994  (Chart 3).
Investment ratios are expected to rise in all developing country regions,
albeit by different  margins. The largest  increase  is expected  to occur in East Asia,
where investment ratios are already the highest-34  percent compared with a
developing  country average of 24 percent. 3 Gross domestic investment  in East
Asia could average as high as 38-39 percent of  GDP in  the next ten years,
amounting  to around $750-800  billion annually  (at 1994  prices) and accounting  for
nearly 45 percent of total investment  in developing  countries  (up from about 30
percent over the past ten years).  Two factors account for the expected strong
growth of investment  in East Asia:  large needs to expand and upgrade existing
infrastructure  capacity which is coming under severe strain as a result of rapid
economic  growth and urbanization;  and investment  requirements  of a major shift
in the industrial  structure of these economies  from predominantly  labor-intensive
manufacturing  to capital-intensive  industries.
With the breakdown  of the old system,  investment  collapsed  in many of the
transition countries  of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union,
recording an estimated average annual decline in real terms of more than  15
percent during 1991-94  for the group as whole. As these countries  progress  from
stabilization  to growth, investment  will recover, and could rise in real terms at 5
percent a year or higher on average  in the next ten years. Total investment  in these
countries  could be on the order of $250 billion annually over the next ten years,
measured  in constant  1994  dollars.
3  This paper uses the standard World Bank country  classification. Under  this classification,  developing
East  Asia excludes three newly industrialized, high-income  East  Asian economies-Hong Kong,
Singapore,  and Taiwan, China.  For a fuller description  of the country  classification,  see World Bank
(1995b).
6Chart 3. Prspective Investment  in developing  countries  by region, 1995-2004
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7Investment  is expected  to rise in Latin  America as the region emerges  from
the shadow  of the debt crisis of the past decade and builds on the stabilization  and
structural  gains of recent years, and in South Asia as that region makes a break
from inward-looking  policies and pervasive govermment  controls that shackled
private  sector  growth  in the past. Over the next ten years, total investment  in these
two regions could average  around $400 billion and $125 billion  per annum,  again
in constant 1994 dollars.  Total investment  in the Middle East and North Africa
region is likely to average roughly the same as in South Asia, starting from a
higher  base than in South  Asia but growing  more slowly.
In Sub-Saharan  Africa also, which at an average of about 16 percent of
GDP has the developing  world's lowest investment  rate, some rise in investment  is
expected, supported by the economic  reforms that a number of countries in the
region are now undertaking.  But total investment in Sub-Saharan  Africa will
remain small relative to other developing  regions, likely averaging  $75 billion or
so annually  over the next ten years (at 1994  prices), and accounting  for less than 5
percent of total investment  in developing  countries  over the same  period.
Supply  of  CapitaL  The prospect of strong growth in investment spending
in developing  countries,  however,  does not imply a parallel large increase in their
demand for foreign capital.  The bulk of the prospective  rise in investment  in
developing  countries  is expected  to be financed  from increases  in these countries'
own savings.  Over the past two decades or so, average investment  and saving
rates in developing countries have generally moved closely together around a
slightly  rising long-term  trend (Chart 4).  Current  World Bank projections are for
the average gross national saving rate in developing countries to rise from 23
percent in the past decade to around 26 percent in the next, roughly  matching  the
projected  rise in their investment  rate (Chart  5).
8Chart  5. Outlook  for Developing  Countries'  saving,  investment  and  current account  bdance.  1985-2004




15 S  Gross doBestic
Investment
M  Gross  natdond
10  6  saving




Source: World Bank da  ta; projections are from  World Bank (  1995 hi.
Note: Includes transition countries.
Chart  6. GDP  Growth  in Developing  Country  Regions
Flercentage  changes  per  year,  1987 prices  and  exchange  rates
Sub-Saharan  Africa  3.8
M. East & N. Africa  3.2
South Asia  4
East Asia  70
Latin Amer. & Carib.  3.
Europe  & C. Asia  -2.5  3.4
Developing  Countries  C
1985-94  1995-2004 1985-94  (Forecast)
Souna  Wod  Bank  (1995b)
9The projected rise in developing  countries' saving rate is underpinned by
projected stronger growth in these countries.  Substantial empirical evidence
supports a positive relationship between growth and saving-a  virtuous circle
whereby higher growth raises the saving rate which helps finance the increased
investment associated with higher growth. 4 Subject to continued progress on
economic reforms, and given the  improved external environment marked by
buoyant  world trade, average  growth  in developing  countries  is currently  projected
by the World Bank to rise from 2.1 percent annually in the last ten years to close
to 5 percent in the next (Chart 6).  The projected acceleration in developing
countries' average  growth appears less sharp if the transition countries,  many of
which experienced  large output declines in the late 1980s and early 1990s, are
excluded.  For  developing countries  excluding this  group,  the  projected
acceleration  is from 4.0 to 5.2 percent, smaller  but still significant.
Saving rates in developing  countries should be boosted also by favorable
demographic  developments. Because  of a falling share in the population  of those
below the working age, the average dependency  ratio in developing  countries is
expected  to decline continuously  for at least the next 20-25 years. Between 1995
and 2015, for example,  the average  dependency  ratio could decline  from around  90
percent to 70 percent (Chart 7).5
An additional boost to saving could come from further fiscal adjustment.
Average  developing  country central government  deficits fell from 5-6 percent of
GDP in the latter half of the 1980s  to 3-4 percent in the early 1990s. Continuing
adjustment  policies  in many countries  are expected  to produce furtier gains in the
4  For some recent  studies,  see Edwards  (1995),  IMF (1995b),  Schmidt-Hebbel  et al. (1994),  and Bosworth
(1993).
5  IMF (1995a). See also Lam and Teh (1995) for prospective  trends in dependency  ratios in East Asia
and their likely impact  on saving.
10Chart 7. Dependency  Ratio  In Developing  Countrles, 1950-2025
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Source.  W4bf Bank  dMat.years  ahead.  For  example,  current  projections  are  for  the  average  central
government deficit of  developing countries to  decline from  about 3 percent  of
6 GDP in  1994 to  about 2 percent by  1996.  An improved public  sector saving
7 performance should contribute to higher overall saving.
As in  investment, the rise  in  saving is expected to be the  largest in  East
Asia.  Over the last ten years, gross national saving in the region averaged a high
33  percent  of  GDP,  having risen  from  27  percent  in  the  previous  ten  years.
Declining youth  dependency  ratios,  combined with  the  virtuous  circle  of  high
investment, high growth and high saving that has been much in evidence in East
Asia in the past two decades, are likely to boost the average regional saving rate to
36-37 percent of GDP over the next ten years.  Saving rates are also expected to
rise in other developing country regions, albeit more moderately and from much
lower levels.  Saving rates in  Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, averaging
about  17 and  15 percent  of  GDP,  respectively,  are  among  the  lowest  in  the
developing  world  (Chart  8),  and  have  declined  over  the  past  decade  or  so.
Provided the macroeconomic and incentive-system reforms now underway remain
on track, saving rates in these regions are expected to recover  some of the  lost
ground, averaging up to two percentage points of GDP higher over the next ten
years than at present.
Domestic financing of  prospective increases in  investment in  developing
countries will be facilitated by a shift in the composition of investment toward the
private sector.  Again, East Asia provides an example.  As noted, a major driver of
investment in  East Asian countries in  coming years will be their vast needs for
infrastructure  development to  support  continued  rapid  industrialization.  It  is
6  IMF(1995a).
Empirical evidence  has tended to reject the notion of a one-to-one  offset  between  public and private
saving-the  so-called  Ricardian  equivalence. Most studies  find the offset  to be little more than one-
half. See,  for example,  Corbo  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991),  Edwards  (1995)  and IMF  (1995a).
12estimated  that to meet these needs, East Asia will need to increase its investment
in infrastructure  from about 5 percent of GDP currently  to 7-8 percent over the
next ten years.  This translates into total infrastructure  investment  of some $1.5
trillion over 1995-2004,  with annual investment  rising from about $100 billion in
1995 to more than $200 billion by 2004 (at 1994 prices). 8 Whereas in the past
these countries  relied heavily on the public sector and foreign funding, they are
increasingly  switching  their infrastructure  investment  toward the private sector  and
domestic  financing. The development  of local capital  markets  is one way in which
these countries  are encouraging  the mobilization  of domestic  resources.  Of the
total private sector investment  in East Asia over the next ten years, only about 4
percent is expected  to rely on foreign  financing. 9
Financing the Balance.  The net claim developing countries make on
industrial countries' savings equals their current account deficit-the  excess of
their gross domestic investment over their gross national saving-plus  the net
change in their external reserves.' 0 Experience shows that, in general, current
account  deficits in developing  countries  substantially  in excess  of about 2 percent
of GDP on a continuing basis are unlikely, and inconsistent with sustainable
external financial  positions in the long run."  Where persistent large imbalances
are not corrected by domestic adjustment,  international  financial markets can be
a World  Bank (1995c);  Kondury  (1994).
9 World  Bank (1995c). This study  of the development  prospects  of East Asia's domestic  capital markets
finds these markets to be playing a  much larger role in coming years in financing the region's
investment  requirements. It estimates,  for example,  that the East Asian bond market will grow  from
about $340 billion in 1994 to more than $1 trillion by 2004.  World Bank (1994b) documents  the
increasing  role of the private  sector  in infratrcture  investment  in developing  countries.
0 Abstracting  from transactions  included  in net errors  and omissions.
As some  recent studies  of the differential  experience  of Latin American  and East Asian countries  with
large capital inflows  have found, external deficits used mainly to finance investment (as in much of
East Asia)  tend to be more sustainable  in the longer-run  than those used largely  to finance consumption
(as in several  Latin American  countries in recent  years). See Corbo  and Hernandez  (1994) and World
Bank  (1995b).
13expected to force the necessary adjustment by ceasing to finance the imbalances,
as happened recently in Mexico.
Current World Bank projections show the aggregate current account deficit
of developing countries averaging around  1.6 percent of GDP over the next ten
years,  only slightly higher than in the past decade  (see Chart 5).  Allowing  for
increases in  reserves  to  maintain  adequate import  cover,  this  translates  into  a
cumulative net capital flow to developing countries of $1.5-2 trillion between 1995
and 2004.  Under these projections, foreign capital will finance around 7 percent
of the total investment in developing countries over this period.
Relative to industrial countries'  total saving and GDP, the net capital flow
to developing countries over the next ten years will remain  small-on  average a
little over 3 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively.  Gross flows would be larger, as
increasing global capital market integration will see rising two-way flows between
developing and industrial countries.
The smallness of these magnitudes suggests that developing countries are
unlikely to face a 'thortage" in international capital markets on account of the size
of the claim they collectively make on these markets.  For individual developing
countries, access to  capital markets will depend mainly on  their own  ability to
attract capital, based on investors' perceptions of their policies and prospects.  The
increasing integration of developing countries in  international capital markets is
reflected  in the  surge in  private  capital flows  to  these  countries  in  the  1990s.
Within this aggregate picture of increasing integration, the dependence of private
flows on individual country circumstances is reflected in the concentration of these
flows in a relatively small number of countries.  Between 1991 and  1994, only a
dozen countries, mostly in East Asia and Latin America, accounted for close to 90
percent of all private capital flows to developing countries (Chart 9).  Developing
14countries  with a record of sound policies and strong economic  prospects should
continue  to be able  to raise needed capital  on intemational  capital  markets  without
much difficulty.
The major recipients  of private capital flows in the developing  world have
been mostly middle-income  countries, with the notable exception of two large
low-income  countries-China and India. Low-income  countries  in general  remain
heavily dependent  on official  flows for their foreign capital needs.  Sub-Saharan
Africa, for example,  received  a paltry 1 percent of total private  flows to developing
countries  over  the past five years, and continues  to obtain 90-95 percent of its total
long-term capital  inflow  from  official  sources, compared with  an  overall
developing country average now of 25-30 percent.  As low-income countries
improve  their economic  performance  and prospects,  they too can begin to attract
private  capital. But even  under favorable  assumptions,  most of them will continue
to rely mainly  on official  capital  for some  time to come.
The demand  for official  capital  from low-income  countries  thus will remain
high, but the supply  is likely to be increasingly  limited. Net official  capital flows
to developing  countries  have leveled  off in the 1990s,  and in real terms have been
declining  (see Chart  2).  So if there is a shortage,  it will be in the supply  of official
capital.  This is of concern particularly  to Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The region not
only relies predominantly  on official sources of finance, as indicated above, but
also has a much heavier dependence on external financing to meet is resource
needs than do other developing  regions. In 1993,  for example,  the external current
account deficit excluding  grants was about 7 percent of GDP on average  in Sub-
Saharan Afiica, compared with an average  of about 3 percent for all developing
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16countries. 12 The prospective  scarcity of official capital increases  the urgency for
countries in  the region to  strengthen domestic resource mobilization and  to
accelerate  economic  reforms  that in time will improve  their prospects  for attracting
private  investment.
Supply and Demand for Savings  in Industrial Countries
From the  above analysis the  capital demands of  developing countries
overall appear unlikely to be a significant source of increased  pressure on world
capital markets and international real interest rates.  These will be  influenced
mainly by the supply  of savings  relative  to the demand  within industrial  countries,
which account for about three-quarters  of the world's total annual savings and
dominate the global capital market.  What is the outlook for the supply and
demand  for savings  in industrial  countries?
Prospects for  Saving.  Saving rates in industrial countries have been on a
long-term declining trend (Chart 10).  The average gross national saving rate in
industrial countries has declined by about 5 percentage points since the early
1970s. While private saving has also declined, the fall in the overall saving  rate
has been concentrated  in the public sector,  with average  public saving  falling from
close to 4 percent of GDP in the 1960s and early 1970s to below zero today.
Many analysts consider  this decline  in public saving in industrial countries  to be
the main factor behind the increased  pressure of demand  on the global supply of
savings that is reflected in the relatively  high world real interest rates seen since
the 1980s. A recent study  attributes  as much as four-fifths  of the rise in world real
12  Including  grants, the current account deficit in 1993  was 2.1 percent of GDP in Sub-Saharan  Africa
and about 2.5 percent  in developing  countries  as a whole.
17interest rates since the  1960s to the worsening of government fiscal positions in
industrial countries.'3
If the decline in saving rates in industrial countries continues, world long-
term real interest rates may rise even higher than the 4 to 4.5 percent average range
observed since the mid-1980s.  Fortunately, however, there  are reasons to think
that the declining trend in industrial country saving rates could be reversed, at least
for a time.
Private saving rates in industrial countries over the next 15 years or so are
likely to  be boosted  by  a rise  in  the  share of  population  of higher-saving age
groups,  as  the  baby  boom  generation  enters  middle  age.  The proportion  of
industrial country population aged between 40-64 years-the  prime earning and
saving years-is  expected to rise from 40 percent today to 45 percent by 2010,
with the proportion of population aged between 20-39 years-typically  a time of
net borrowing-declining  from 42 to 34 percent (Chart  11).  This  demographic
shift is expected to more than offset the negative effect on saving of a continuing
rise in the share in population of those over 65 years-who  typically save little or
dissave-from  18 to 21 percent.  Also, the baby-boom generation is much richer
and appears to be saving at higher rates than its previous cohorts.  It is estimated
that  these  factors  could  cause  aggregate  net  household  financial  savings  in
industrial countries to rise in real terms over a ten-year period by about $5 trillion
on top of a trend increase of about $7 trillion, yielding a total of $12 trillion (Chart
12).14 The favorable demographic shift is expected to be especially pronounced in
the United States, potentially raising its net saving rate from 4.9 percent in  1992 to
6.2 percent in 2010.
"  IMMF(1995a).
14  McKinsey  (1994). See  also Borsch-Supan  (1995).
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19Adequacy  of  Saving  and  the  Need for  Fiscal  Consolidation.  Will this
boost to the supply of capital be adequate to meet the increase in demand?  The
outcome will depend  critically on  the  evolution of fiscal balances  in  industrial
countries.  It  is  estimated  that  net  private  investment  in  industrial  countries
financed through capital markets could account for up to $5 trillion of the increase
in  net household financial  savings over  a ten year-period.'5 That would  leave
roughly an equivalent amount  of  net  household financial  savings  available for
financing industrial country government deficits, after allowing for net capital flow
to developing countries of $1.5-2 trillion.  Could the absorption of private savings
by government borrowing in industrial countries over the next ten years be kept
within that order of magnitude?
On the basis of past trends and existing expenditure programs, the aggregate
borrowing requirement of governments in industrial countries would appreciably
exceed  $5  trillion  over  a  ten  year  period,  which  would  squeeze  the  capital
available both  for  private  investment  in  industrial  countries  and  for  flows  to
developing countries, putting upward pressure on interest rates.  An  illustrative
worst-case  scenario is depicted in  Chart  13.  Constructed by extrapolating past
trends  on the  assumption of no  change in  policies  and programs,  it shows  an
accelerating deterioration of the fiscal positions of most major industrial countries.
The indicated  increases  in  budget deficits and  public  debt to  multiples of  the
already high present levels are clearly not feasible, but serve to bring the need for
fiscal consolidation into sharp relief.
Recently, however, the governments of industrial countries have started to
show greater resolve in coming to grips with the major fiscal challenges they face.
The  average  structural  general  government budget  deficit of  OECD  countries
'5  McKinsey (1994).
20Chart 13. Fiscal Position of Some Major Industrial Countries:
An Illustrative Scenario
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21declined from 3.7 percent in  1992 to  3.2 percent in  1994.  The actual  general
government budget deficit declined from 4.5 percent in  1993 to  3.9 percent  in
1994.  A number  of  industrial  countries have announced medium-term  deficit-
reduction  objectives.  Based  on  these,  the  OECD projects  the  average  actual
general government budget deficit in industrial countries to fall from 3.9 percent in
1994 to  1.9 percent  in  2000.16  Sustained  progress  on  these  efforts  at  fiscal
consolidation will be needed to  keep government absorption  of private  savings
within  the  amounts  available  without  putting  further upward  pressure  on  real
interest rates.
Most  current  projections,  including  the  World  Bank's  current  baseline
projections,'7 assume  that  the  fiscal  consolidation  efforts  now  underway  in
industrial countries will be sustained, and will be sufficiently strong to help avoid
a global crowding-out scenario that could otherwise result, with potentially serious
consequences for world real interest rates and  capital flows.  But  achieving the
necessary fiscal adjustment will be a major and difficult challenge for industrial
country governments, and the possibility of a faltering of these adjustment efforts
constitutes an important risk in the global capital market outlook.
A major area  of  fiscal  adjustment will be  the  reform of  social security
systems. The unsustainability of present social security policies is indicated by the
fact that the present value of unfunded public pension liabilities in most major
industrial countries ranges from 100 to  250 percent of  GDP (Chart  14)."8 That
means that the implicit social security debt is a multiple of an already large explicit
public debt (in gross terms, the latter now averages over 70% of GDP in industrial
countries, having jumped from about 40% only fifteen years ago).
16  OECD(1995a).
17 World Bank (1995b).
'8  Van der Noord and Herd (1993) and World Bank (1994a).
22Chart 14. Explicit Debt versus Implicit Public Pension Debt
in Some Major Industrial Countries, 1990
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23It is important to  note that the  boost to  private saving rates in industrial
countries from a rising proportion of middle-aged savers, though significant, will
be temporary.  Around 2010, the share in industrial country populations of those
over 65 years will start to rise rapidly while the share of 40-64-year-olds will fall,
tending to depress private saving rates once again (Charts 11 and 15). At the same
time, the rising proportion of retirees in the work force will add to public pension
liabilities, which at that point could start to rise exponentially unless the pension
systems were  reformed. 19 This  underscores  the  importance  of  investing  the
temporary increment in savings over the next decade or so as profitably as possible
(including in developing countries), to generate maximum returns that will support
the rising ranks of future pensioners, and at the same time initiating timely actions
to reform social security systems to place them on a sustainable footing.  Limiting
government deficits in industrial countries and so allowing more capital to flow to
developing  countries  that  offer  an  abundance  of  profitable  investment
opportunities would thus prove beneficial to both groups of countries.  The fast
integrating international  capital markets would  facilitate  such  global,  mutually
beneficial reallocation of capital toward more profitable uses.
While reducing public dissaving is a priority, the declining secular trend in
private saving rates in industrial countries calls for attention to the need to correct
incentive distortions that depress the private propensity to  save.  Social security
reform, together with tax reform, would be important in that respect as well.  Some
analysts consider generous, unfunded public social security systems perhaps the
main  factor  in  the  decline  of  private  saving  in  industrial  countries. 20
19 This possibility is indeed a  major reason for the  accelerating deterioration of government fiscal
positions  depicted  in the illustrative  scenario  in Chart 13.
20  Feldstein (1994),  for example,  finds that social  security  programs  in the United States reduce private
saving  to about half of what it might  otherwise  be. See  also  Poterba  (1994).
24As Chile's successful  experience  with privatization  of pension  plans shows,  social
security reform can make an important contribution to raising saving also in
developing  countries.
Conclusions
The foregoing  outlook for global capital demand and supply suggests  that
international  capital markets  will tend to be tight in the years ahead, but a severe
global capital squeeze  and a sharp rise in world real interest rates that some fear
are not inevitable.  The key will be fiscal outcomes in  industrial countries.
Provided  progress  on fiscal consolidation  in these countries  continues,  prospective
increases  in the global demand  for capital can be accommodated  within the likely
increases  in supply. In this scenario,  world long-term  real interest rates will not be
expected  to rise beyond the recent average of around 4 percent, and could even
decline if the fiscal effort is sufficiently  strong.  On the other hand, absent the
reduction in fiscal deficits, world real interest rates could rise well above the
already historically high recent levels, with  adverse consequences for  both
industrial  and developing  countries.
T'he single most important implication for policy that emerges from an
assessment  of the outlook  for global capital  demand  and supply  thus is the need for
strong and sustained  efforts at fiscal consolidation  in industrial  countries. Central
to fiscal consolidation,  and with favorable  implications  for private saving, will be
the reform of social security systems.  The timing of reform matters, as acting
early will help improve the fiscal positions and reform entitlement programs
before the share of the elderly in industrial country populations begins to rise
rapidly.
Developing  countries' demand  for foreign  capital  will rise but is unlikely  to
be a major source of pressure on world real interest rates.  Increased  investment
25spending by these countries will for the most part be financed from increases in
their  own  savings.  The magnitude  of the  net  capital  flow  from  industrial  to
developing  countries  is  small compared with  the  budget  deficits  of  industrial
countries (Chart 16).  In  1994, for example, a reduction in industrial  countries'
aggregate budget deficit of about one-fifth would have been enough to finance the
whole of the net capital flow to developing countries.
Saving in  developing countries, of  course, will not rise  automatically to
support  higher  investment.  A  domestic  economic  environment,  policies  and
institutions conducive to higher saving will be needed.  Especially important are
macroeconomic  stability  that  underpins  strong  and  sustainable  growth,  fiscal
discipline,  reforms  in  pricing  and  the  tax  and  transfer  system  that  remove
disincentives to  saving, and well-functioning financial markets and  institutions.
These are also among the conditions that promote investment and attract foreign
capital.  Countries that are successful in raising investment and foreign capital on a
sustained  basis  will  also  be the  ones  generating  a  complementary  increase  im
domestic saving.
Investment, like trade, thus is not a zero-sum game.  Resources available to
finance  investment  are  not  fixed.  As  East  Asia's  experience  shows,  higher
investment can call forth higher saving, through the commonality of many of their
underlying determinants and the dynamics of the growth process.  Foreign capital
also tends to flow on a steadier basis to countries with high domestic investment
and  saving, and  therefore  high  economic  growth.  These  both  attract  foreign
capital and help to limit it to sustainable levels.
Despite  increasing  global  capital  market  integration  and  the  surge  in
aggregate private capital flows to developing countries, a relatively small number
of countries account for the bulk of the private flows.  For individual developing
26Chart 16. Comparison  of Claims  on Resources,  1978-94
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countries, it is not trends in capital markets at the global level that will mainly
determine inflows but  their  own  policies and prospects that  affect foreign
investors' perceptions  of their creditwortiiness  and viability. And, as emphasized
above,  this includes  in particular  conditions  that promote  high domestic  investment
and saving. Where domestic saving remains  low, or worse still falls as foreign
saving becomes a substitute for domestic saving, significant private flows will
either not be attracted  or, as happened  in Mexico,  not be sustainable.
For most low-income, low-growth developing countries, private capital
inflows will remain limited, until the time they are able to achieve substantial
improvement  in their policies, performance  and prospects.  These countries in
general will have to continue to rely mainly on official sources to meet their
foreign capital requirements for some time to come, and could face financing
constraints  if the recent stagnation  in official flows continues.  The prospective
27tighter supply  of official  capital  intensifies  the need for these countries  to mobilize
more domestic  resources  and to quicken  the pace of economic  reforms  that in the
medium term would enable these countries to begin to  attract more private
investment.
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